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1.	 HIERARCHICALP _""LING AND MONITORING WITH CONCEPTUAL LEVELS
t
This work deals with the use of knowledge-base architecture and plan-
w" ning	 control
	
mechanisms to perform an intelligent monitoring task in the
flight domain.
	 Progress made this past year centers oa the final	 refine-
ment
	 of the conceptual levels planning approach and the implementation of
this design.	 At this time the implementation is 	 nearly	 completed.	 The
route level, the trajectory level, and parts of the aerodynamics level can
A
now be demonstrated.
-^ The conceptual
	
levels	 approach
	
proposes	 an	 alternate	 method	 of
obtaining global viewpoint: model the domain at different degree of global cs
"
fl^
viewpoint.	 A complex real -world domain such as the flight domain requires
global
	 viewpoint	 durin`	 planning.	 Let us define the primitive ground-
.	 t
Wlevel operators to be the physical control act,vns the f1ght crew	 perform
during	 flight.	 Suppose	 we	 record the flight crew during flight with a
video recorder.
	 A physical action is what the flight crew does each 	 time
a control element is changed.
	
Since the flight domain is a dynamic domain
1
' 	 t
and some of these control elements need to be adjusted frequently one	 can
see	 that the state space is quite large.
	
To plan a flight at the ground-:
,. 'level, worrying about the control positions second by second,	 is	 clearly 6
{a not fesible.
In addition to being a complex domain, the flight domain places addi -
tionaldemand on the planner because the plat must conform to domain con-
straints.	 Some constraints are global while others are more 	 local.	 For
3	 -	 -
97
F,
2
example,	 to	 have a safe flight, the aircraft should not run out of fuel,
ati should fl	 a navigable eours, such that it does not	 et lost	 should	 noty	 	 g
I fly into a mountain nor through icing condition nor turbulence, should not
fly so fast that the airframe is damaged nor so	 slow	 that	 the	 aircraft
r
stalls.
	 The	 planner	 must	 generate a plan that achieves the goal while
satisfying	 these constraints.
i
p
It is interesting to
	
note	 that
	
these	 constraints	 have	 different
scope.	 Scope	 means	 the	 extent of coverage over, the ground-level plan,
roughly analogous to global viewpoint.
	
A constraint such as "the aircraft
I
should
	
not	 run	 out	 of	 fuel"	 has very large scope since it affect the
structures of the entire plan.	 A constraint such as "do not stall the air-
craft"	 has	 very	 small	 scope since it affects very small portion of the
^ y ground-level plan.	 A constraint such as "do not fly in turbulence" has 	 a 1
scope	 somewhere	 in between.	 The reader may also notice that these con- {
straints are not directly related to each other.
	
For example, the "do not
k run	 out	 of fuel" constraint, while operating at a larger scope, is not a
more general version of the "do not fly in turbulence" constraint.
rf
The immediate effect of the conceptual levels approach 	 is	 to	 breakP	 P ^	 k
the	 complex
	 domain	 into simpler homogeneous minidomains. 	 By specifying c
the minidomains along
	
different facets of the domain, the domain complex-
'' 	i
ity	 is	 reduced	 to several nearly independent less complex domains which
are causally complete by th emselves.	 This	 reduction	 of	 complexity	 is
•x ; l
similar	 to	 the problem-solving paradigm that if a task is too difficult,
divide it into easier subtasks and solve ,the "s,ubtaskz.	 The division	 here
Ar
is to partition the domain semantics along the aspects of the domain, thus ;ff'
reducing the search space inside a	 subdivision.	 instead	 of	 complexity
f
,i
xS
j.,
3
reduction through task decomposition, the complexity reduction is through
domain knowledge partitioning.
While domain complexity reduction im desirable, the flight planner
requires global viewpoint. Global viewpoint can be obtained through vert-
ical domain knowledge decomposition. This is done by constructing mini-
domains of different soo on or in other wo ds mod 1 the d ain at dif-p ,	 r 	 ,	 e	 om
feeent degree of global viewpoint.
	
It is vertical because the	 minidomain
of	 the
	 largest	 scope makes decisions which guide planning 	 at the mini-
domain of lesser scope.
Domain knowledge decomposition
	
achieves a reduction in	 complexity,
but with the gain also comes the drawback of limited viewpoint. 	 The, cause
of this limited viewpoint is the partitioning	 of	 the	 domain	 knowledge. Y
The	 conceptual levels architecture achieves both broad viewpoint and nar-
row, focused viewpoint because of the multiple conceptual levels. 	 The top 'f
level	 is	 constructed to support the broad viewpoint and the bottom level
F
is constructed to support the tight detailed viewpoint. 	 The	 problem	 is
that	 since
	
not	 one	 conceptual level can cover both the broad and tight
viewpoint, the planner cannot see the total picture at a given time.	 Thus
tl	 ;
e	 Q
the	 planner 4,annot plan with absolute accuracy at the high level, nor can 4
it appreciate its role at the low level.
t
Since tbiq
 levels hierarchy is designed to	 provide	 global	 viewpoint
r
for	 the	 low-level
	
planners, the inability to look ahead at low level is
not a problem.
	 However, the high-level planner, not	 able	 to	 plan	 with 4
absolute	 accuracy,
	 is	 a problem.
	
Planning proceeds top-down; the route t'
t
planner	 plans to satisfy global constraints, then the trajectory 	 planner
plans	 to	 satisfy	 constraints	 of	 intermediate	 scope,	 and finally the
r4
IL
4
aerodynamics planner flies the aircraft and 	 tells
	
the	 subsystems
	
level
4 what
	 is necessary to fly.
	
Me difficulty is that since the route planner
i
is buffered from the engine systsm and the actual flying, it does not know
for
	 certain	 what	 are	 the	 aircraft range and ceiling. 	 And yet, if the
route planner consider the trajectory, the aerodynamics control	 settings,
^ and
	 the subsystem control settings to determine the exact range and ceil-
ing values while considering
	 traversing	 an	 airway	 segment,	 the	 route
planner	 would be bogged down in detail which the architecture is de91.gned
specifically to avoid.
This is an insoluable catch-22 problem inherent to this architecture.
^^p One	 must	 choose between risking the combinatorial explosion to ensure an
' accurate world model at the high level or risking a bad plan at
	
the	 high
level due to an inaccurate world model.
	
The least of two evils appears to
F
be the second choice: plan at high level with a possibly inaccurate	 world
model.	 This	 approach	 introduces two new wrinkles to top-down planning:
n replanning may be necessary and bottom-up verification of the world 	 model
§
}y
J
t
K
is required.
Planning is ;necessarily top-down in
	
this	 architecture because	 the
low-level	 planner
	 cannot	 make	 global
	
decisions and yet it cannot plan
^	 E
without the global decisions since these global
	
decisions influence	 its
,w
F
planning.
	 Planning	 decisions are made at high level based on a possibly {
°_ inaccurate world models and yet this high-level world 	 modal can	 not	 be
ba
verified
	 until	 the	 low-level	 plan	 is set.	 When the low-level plan is
done, it is examined to verify that it agrees with the model of the	 level
it
above,	 and	 agian	 vith the levels above.	 Thep lan is not finished until
ra
all the models agree.
i
-A
V.
[34
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U
5
Model updating is also necessary when the external world changes
unexpectedly. For example, suppose the flap is stuck after takeoff. The
trajectory level and the route level should be aware of this and check
their plans to make sure they are still good. Similarly, a failed engine
or an unexpectedly stiff headwind re4uires model updating and plan check-
ing. The model updating is initiated at the level where the change
occurred. For example, a stuok flap is initiated at the aerodynamics
level, and a fuel leak is initiated at the subsystems level. The extent
of model updating depends on the situation and is controlled by inter-
level planning control.
The conceptual levels planner is implemented in Franz LISP.	 More
specifically, it is implemented in rule system and frame system. All
static knowledge structures are implemented in a locally	 developed	 frame F
s
system, written in Franz LISP.
	
All active knowledge structures are imple-
mented in a rule s system, more specifically, the OPSS rules system written
in Franz LISP.
	
Both knowledge structure systems are contained in the same
`s
lisp environment running on a VAX 11 /780 computer.	 In	 addition,	 a	 PDP-
11/45	 computer and a Ramtek color graphics system are used to display the f
Er
aircraft environment.'
The rules contain the meta-planning
	
knowledge.	 This	 meta-planning j
knowledge
	 ct..ntain both the intra-level planning control knowledge and the
inter-level planning	 control	 knowledge.	 Presently,	 approximately	 100
rules	 are	 implemented.
	
These	 rules	 control the planning at the route 'a":
level, the trajectory level, and the	 partially	 implemented	 aerodynamics "f	
p
level.	 As	 the	 levels	 are	 further developed and refined, there may be
approximately 200 rules.
^Y F
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The frame system is used to represent domain knowledge and the plan
structure. In fact, since thore are Four levels, the entire plan struc-
ture is made up of four substructures. The domain knowledge represented
in a frame consists of knowledge such as the airports, the vortac
transmitters, the airway segments between the vortao transmitters, the
attainable eruiza trajectories, the attainable climb trajectories, the
attainable descent trajectories, thA cruise phase, the climb phase, the
descent phase, the climb force vector equilibrium system, the cruise force
vector equilibrium system, etc. The plan operators are represented in
frame structure, and naturally the resulting plan is similarly
represented.
The planning system is presently implemented down to the aerodynamics
level. The planning process is displayed both on a terminal and on the
Ramtek graphics monitor. The aerodynamics level will be completed in the
near-term future. More detailed discussion of the theory and the imple-
mentation is available shortly in a technical report.
y
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2.	 FUNCTT4N-DIRECTED MECHANIM RAT_QNALIZATI QN
t Scenario
t
Consider the following scenario.	 An expert in a specific mechanism
1
domain	 is	 given a diagramatic representation of the physical structurefk
f
4
of an instance of a specific mechanism.
	 Furthermore, let us assume that
he	 is told the name of the mechanssm.	 This name is meaningful to him -
N
he knows what the abstract function of the mechanism instance
	
must	 be.
t
What	 we	 require	 of	 this	 expert	 is	 an	 explanation of the instance
behavior of the instance in question. 	 This explanation is a product	 of
x the application of the expert's mechanism understanding process.
4
Mechanism Understanding
We are interested in the underlying concepts and principles of this 14
mechanism understanding process.
1
There may be several instances of a specific mechanism - for	 exam-
ple, there are several instances of the amplifier which use the transis-
tor as the active element, and sever4 instances of the amplifier 	 which
use the operational amplifier as the active element. 	 As a further exam- r
° ple, there are several instances of the thermostat - one incorporating a
F
bimetallic	 strip	 as	 the	 temperature-sensitive	 element,	 and another
°
incorporating a gas bellow as the temperature-sensitive 	 element.	 Thus ..
- the	 physical structures of the various instances in question may appear !
quite different.	 However, the	 abstract	 function	 of	 these	 instances
^l
remains	 the	 same.	 The	 instance	 behaviors,	 which	 are	 generated
rt	
T
i
T
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M
analytically from the physical structures, will accordingly be unique to
the inutance in question. However, the expert seems to be able to cope
- he can rationalize an instance of a mechanism which appears familiar,
but which he has never seen before. Accordingly, the generation of an
explanation of the instance behavior must begin from the known abstract
function of the mechanism instance in question.
Generally speaking, the understanding process is a forward qualita-
tive reasoning or qualitative simulation. 	 The explanation of the
instance behavior of the instance in question is an artifact of the
expert's analytical understanding prQ#^  ess. This understanding process
may be based on functional component state models as the qualitative
knowledge primitives (ire Kleer], or it may be based on functional pro-
cess models as the qualitative knowledge primitives (F'orbual.	 Some
input signal is introduced as the input of the instance or situation.
This input signal is then propagated through the qualitative constraints
1
r
J	 '
n
^n
.N
^a
imposed by the primitive models, and the qualitative constraints imposed
by their connection scheme into an instance or situation. The imprecise
N
resolution of this analysis is introduced because of the approximate
nature of qualitative simulation. Thus, qualitative simulation leads to
many possible interpretations of instance behavior, each with a unique
	
'II
set of key assumptions chosen at decision points encountered during the 	 r
8
course of that simulation. We are identifying such ambiguity classes.	 1
We believe that a qualitative simulation process of some kind is;A2
^f
necessary for understanding how an instance of a mechanism can achieve
	 ix
i!
the characteristic function of that mechanism.
	 j
4^J}
R	 ,
^x
j
c
K
i
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This qualitative simul).wi.on step should not be applied without some
careful, knowledge -based focusing and simplification of the instance in
question. Domain knowledge of the abstract meohanism function and
domain knowledge of physical subst'ructures encountered in the past can
and should be utilized to properly frame the mechanism instance for
understanding through qualitative simulation.
.2.3• Prgblem Eogua
The understanding process begins with the expert knowledge of the
abstract function of the mechanism. The expert knows what the instance
must be designed to achieve. This expert knowledge serves as global
control to direct the analytical understanding process. It in used to
direct a decomposition of the understanding problem into many separate,
almost
-
independent, stand-alone subproblems. In doing no, this expert
knowledge is used to constrain the understanding analysis by establish-
ing all of the environments of complete definitive mechanism operation,
one for each subproblem. An environment is identified with a functional
goal that the instance behavior must achieve. The composition of all of
the functional goals of all of these almost- independent subproblems is
the overall mechanism Function. An environment is specified by adding
the knowledge of what input signal is characteristic of the srt;lfunction
goal, and what output signal is expected to be achieved as an effect of
the constraints imposed by the components and connection scheme of the
instance in question.
,t
i?
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Take as an example, the nand circuit.
	 The abstract function of the
nand.. circuit is a multi-state truth table description using the language
of logical 1 0' and 1 1 1 .	 Knowing that the instance in question is a nand
circuit,
	
the	 appropriate	 chunk
	
of	 knowledge comes to the fore. 	 The
expert immediately makes many knowledge based assumptions. 	 Among	 these
V
assumptions,	 he	 decomposes the understanding of the instance into four
f lmost-independent subproblem environments	 -	 one	 for	 each	 situation
associated	 with	 a truth table entry.	 The composition of the resulting
explanations of all of these understanding	 subproblems	 is	 a	 complete
C:-
w'" explanation	 of the overall nand circuit function.	 Associated with each
environment is the function goal of that
	
environment	 -	 achieving	 the
appropriate	 logic	 signal
	
vector	 at	 the	 output	 terminals, when the
eharacteristia input logic signal vector is introduced at the input ter-
°` minalr,	 Tt,^.	 expert thus decomposes his analytic understanding problem
$
into four separate perspectives (a perspective is a
	
physical
	
structure
in	 an	 environment with a specific function goal). 	 These four perapee -
a-,
tives can be reduced to three if symmetry of nand circuit 	 input	 termi-
nals is taken into account - the (0 1 -> 1) situation and the (1 0 -> 1)
situation are symmetrical.
t
Problem focus is achieved by using the 	 abstract	 function	 of	 the
instance
	 in	 question	 to direct the decomposition of the understanding
problem.	 A perspective allows us to focus on the subproblem at hand	 to
, the exclusion of all other subproblems. 	 For each subproblem, it identi-
fies the specific environment in which that instance 	 must	 operate	 and tr
the	 specific	 function	 goal or subfunction that that instance behavior 3	 f
must achieve.	 A perspective also focuses 	 the	 subproblem	 at	 .hand	 by
__ A.-4
„ t
. rya-a►° w a«,,,,K..,..,,..
&.
._	 :.
b 1^,
A telling us what irrelevant •, details to ignore and discard in the analyti-
cal understanding process for that subproblem.	 For each	 subproblem	 of
the nand circuit, we are no longer concerned with the specific node vol-
'cage values.	 We instead speak in a language of 	 logical	 1 0 1	 and	 111.
The	 perspective	 also	 dictates	 the type of qualitative analysis which
t4
should be used to analyze each particular subproblem. 	 We	 know	 not	 to
1
,. perform	 small	 signal	 perturbation	 analysis to determine the relevant
instance behavior.	 We are no longer interested in the state	 transition
history	 of	 the	 multi-state	 components.	 We	 instead know to perform
steady-state do analysis for each nand circuit perspective.
' 2.4.	 Problem 5iml2lifieation
o,
The analytical understanding process is controlled and organized in
a	 top-down	 manner into perspectives as directed by the mechanism func-
tion.
	
The understanding problem is thus focused through a decomposition,
process.	 A	 protean to simplify the subproblem at hand is the recogni-
tion and consequent clustering of	 physical ,substructures 	 into	 single ;!
behavioral	 entities.	 This process works in a bottom-up manner since it
begins from the physical structure of the 	 instance	 in	 question.	 The
'^h i k
expert	 often distinguishes and circles substructures on the diagramati-
1
^y
cal represenation of the instance in question.	 He recognizes these sub-
,r
structures as ones that he has seen before.	 This recognition simplifies
the physical, structure	 of	 the	 instance	 in	 question	 by	 a	 physical.' {
i abstraction	 of	 detail.	 Each recognized substructure is composed in a*
sense and replaced by a single macro-component with unit function. 	 The
result is a simpler physical structure with fewer constituent components
N
 mar,. ,.
12
y
r
in a simpler connective topology.
Take as an example, the two-stage do amplifier. 	 The abstract func-
tion
	 of	 the	 two-stage do amplifier is an equational de kscription using
the language of 'Gain' and 'Offset'. 	 An amplifier expert would	 immedi-
ately	 recognize that the instance contains two physical substructures -
amplifier stages - which each contain three components, and one physical
substructure	 -	 voltage	 divider - which contains two components.	 As a
?m result, the expert can generate another level of diagramatic representa-
tion	 of	 the	 physical
	
structure	 of the mechanism instance.	 This new
' representation level is the result of 	 an	 abstraction	 of	 the	 initial
r diagrammatic	 representation	 of the physical structure of the mechanism
tM E+
'S instance.	 He composes these three 	 physical	 substructures	 into	 three
macro-components
	
through
	 a physical abstraction of detail. 	 The result
is a simpler physical structure of three 	 constituent	 components	 in	 a
' simpler linear connective topology. 	 Associated with each macrocomponent
is its own abstract function description.	 Each amplifier stagy; has
	
its
own	 component	 parameter 'Gain'.
	
Thus, there is an associated abstrac-
tion of the parametric description of the 	 new	 components	 in	 the	 new
i
level of physical structure.	 The physical structure may be reduced even
further, to two components,	 if	 the	 expert
	
recognizes	 that	 the	 two
`^- amplifier	 stages
	 can	 be	 composed
	 into a single functional composite
amplifier stage - a still more abstract level of physical stuoture. 	 The
i
gain	 parameters	 of the two amplifier stages are multiplied together to
produce the more abstract parameter
	 gain
	
of	 the	 composite	 amplifier
stage.
z	 1j
f	 ;a
,m}
r
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Problem simplification is achieved cg l using	 the	 knowledge	 gained
from	 past	 experience	 to recognize and abstract familiar substructures
1
enseounced in the mechanism instance in question. 	 Each	 maer000mponent
t
model	 is	 described
	
or	 encoded using syntactically the same format as
that used to describe primitive component models.	 In this way, a physi-
cal structure composition hierarchy is produced that enables explanation
at various levels of detail. 	 The analysis is also	 focused	 by	 working
with	 the	 more	 abstract	 parameters which describe the macro-component
function rather than the more numerous, less abstract 	 parameters	 which
f
describe	 the	 functions	 of	 the	 substructure	 components.	 Physical
abstraction focuses on the appropriate level of the 	 parameter	 language
to	 be	 used	 in	 the description of instance behavior. 	 Unlike perspec-
tives, the introduction of levels of detail summarizes and saves detail,
r^
which	 may	 be recalled for consideration rather than being totally dis-
carded.
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3• USING DM-.LEVEL 14ECHANISM MOD= FU DDjAafi ES a PENDENT
FAILURES
,V
F;
3.1•	 Overview, And ,S Ummary i
This final report summarizes the result of our research on 	 the
model-based
	 diagnoses	 under	 many years of NASA support.	 We first
briefly overview our approach to the mechanism	 diagnosis	 problems.
In	 our	 diagnosis methodology, we decompose the diagnosis task into
two subtasks: hypothesization and verification. 	 In the hypothesiza-
tion
	 phase,	 a set of failure possibilities is heuristically postu-
lati^d. Then in the verification phase, the expected behavior of each
failure	 hypothesis, as predicted from reasoning with the deep-level
mechanism model, is matched against the symptoms actually	 observed.
The	 main	 theoretical issues of our research lie in the development ai.
of a deep-level mechanism model (which we call the 	 state-transition '.
model,	 and the use of such a model for reasoning about the qualita-
a
tive behavior of a faulty mechanism (a process 	 which	 we	 call	 the
f'
predictive
	
analysis).	 Those theoretical issues are thoroughly dis-
cussed in Pan's Ph.D. dissertation [11, which also investigates	 two
interesting
	 aspects	 of hypothesis verification, namely, the use ofsV
qualitative symptom features, and the use of transient	 symptoms	 in i
verification. II
In this report, we focus our discussion on	 issues	 related	 to
the	 hypothesization	 process	 which, though less theoretical in its
nature, serves as an important link between Ue	 proposed	 diagnosis
theory	 and
	
its	 real-world	 applications..	 In the next section, we
first use an idealized mechanism model (called 	 the	 Production-Line
t
y:i	 r ^....... ..	 .,	 ..	 .. .	 .........r:.:..^.u...e.. -. ua	 4	
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model) to explain: (1) how traditional diagnosis approaches have
been "made" easy, and (2) what the underlying assumptions being
imposed on there approaches are. Then we discuss our heuristical
approach for dealing with a non-ideal situation: the real-world ana-
log mechanisms. A Flow-Causality model is introduced to decompose
the functionality of a mechanism into two levels: the Causal Level
in which the diagnostic principles developed for PL-modeled mechan-
isms can be "heuristically" applied (with exceptional cases), and
the Flow Level in which special (expert) diagnostic knowledge for
each type of flow systems has to be adopted. As the result of the
discussions on diagnoses based on the PL-mechanisms, the limitations
of a straightforward diagnostic approach can be better understood,
and the analyses of its weakness forms the basis for the future
development of a diagnosis strategy applicable to general analog
f
mechanisms.
At the end of this chapter, we propose a system organization
for the future intelligent diagnosis system constructed based on our
theory.
3.	 Generations Qf ZAIJ,ure Hypotheses	 {, '
i
	Within the context of a time-complicated mechanism with	 ti:a
dependent-failure
	
possibilities,	 the generation of	 failure	 +° J
hypotheses is a task of postulating possibilities of the primary,
	
failure based on the initial symptom-snapshot which triggers the 	
*a`
detection of a i'ailure. Our hypothesis generation is similar to
x,
	
traditional diagnosis problems in two ways: (1) the task is based on	 t
i
symptoms observed at one single snapshot, and (2) the goal is to
E.
t.
r.
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assert a set of single -failure possibilities which can potentially
d causes the observed symptoms. In view of our overall diagnosis
approach, the verification process will refine the result of this
failure hypothesization to (1) incorporate the use of time-elapsed
symptoms for resolutions among the hypotheses, and (2) understand
and thus explain dependent failures.
A naive approach for generating failure hypotheses is to pro-
pose all possible failures. However, by doing so, an enormous com-
putational problem will be created in the verification process. 	 A
smarter approach will adopt some heuristically-based reasoning pro-
cess to select a set of most-likely failure possibilities among the
space of all possible failures.
A straightforward approach is to adopt the production -system
paradigm [ 2] by which expert's rules for diagnoses are encoded and
utilized to map the symptoms to possible failures. While not ques-
tioning the effectiveness of the production-system approach in deal-
ing .;.rith a specific ,mechanism, such approach totally bypasses the
well -formulated modeling knowledge which engineers develop to
analyze the domain. An alternative approach will be , to develop a
functional model of the mechanism, and to use the model in deriving
failure hypotheses from observed symptoms. In comparing these two
approaches, the model-based approach is theoretically more interest-
ing in that the methodology we develop in dealing with the modeling
of mechanisms and the using of models can be applied on othe r
mechanisms, while with the production-system approach each mechanis m
17
has to be treated as a special easel.
E	
s^
4 In this chapter, our focus is on the model-based approach.
	 Wef
first discuss the hypothesization problem in an idealized mechanism
f
modeled by the "loopfree -production-line" model, which helps us
{ understand the limitations of existing Aldiagnosis worka and setsi	 .
the .stage for the discussion of our approach in	 dealing	 with	 non-
ideal situations.	 We then discuss the hypothesis generation problem
in an analog mechanism with a proposed functional model, called 	 the
"flow-causality model".
A 1.2._t.	 .hg Loonfree-Pro	 ei tion Line, Model ,1, ,	 Mechanisms
!
a To understand how failure possibilities can	 be	 hypothesized
from
	 symptoms by 'reasoning with a functional model of the mechan-
ism, we first study an ideal situation in which such tasks can	 be 1
performed	 with a straightforward diagnostic logic. 	 Assuming that
we are dealing with an ideal mechanism in which interactions among
sub-modules
	 can be modeled in such a way that ( 1) propagations of
;a
effects
	 ( signals)	 among	 modules	 is	 always	 "unidirectional",
namely,	 hatever	 failure	 occurred beyond the output of a moduleY s
	
Y	 P  t
4
L.
will not affect the behavior of upstream	 modules,	 (2)	 a	 module' i
will behave differently if its input is abnormal, and (3) there is 31	 `
.a no loop existing in propagations of effects 	 among	 modules.	 For
the	 purpose	 of	 easy	 reference,
	
we will call such an idealized ^c
However,, a diagnosis approach based on the production system 	 Para-
digm has its advantage in that it can encode global diagnostic knowledge
which is not direct rationalizable from deep-level mechanism models. Ex- "	 !
amples	 of	 such	 knowledge	 are	 special
	
experiences (e.g., engine vi-
brates), priori-probabilities, etc. ?
i
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mechanism the loopfree-production-line model (since	 a	 production
line	 is	 usually loop-free, we call it a "production-line r' ( PL )
model for short) for
	
its	 similarity
	 to	 the	 station-to-station
f
interactions	 in	 the	 production-line	 of a factory.	 As shown in
figure 3.1(a), a typical product-j',on line has a
	
sequence	 of	 pro-
oessing	 stations	 (A,B,C,D in this example). Interactions between
two processing stations are done by a conveyer belt which 	 carries
o.
partial products from one station to another.	 If a failure occurs
A(say in station C, as shown in figure
	
3.1(b)),	 we	 will	 observe
symptoms
	 in	 station	 C (partial products piling up) and stations
° downstream to Cwhich is station D with no "input" products),(	 P	 P	 ), but
never on its upstream stations A and B.
In a mechanism describable	 by	 the	 loopfree-production-line t
model,	 the	 partially-ordered
	
causalities	 are	 implicitly esta-
blished among its modules, corresponding to the directions of sig-
nal	 propagations.	 With	 the	 assumption	 that there is a way to
determine the normal/abnormal status of 	 an	 operational	 module2,
the	 isolation of the faulty module can be achieved by backtracing '.•-
affi
(Q{
IA	
+.i	 s
along the causal paths of the mechanism.	 In the	 following	 Para-
.
graphs,	 we	 discuss	 four	 basic	 diagnosis	 principles, (namely,
f	
^
causal-baektracing, fault-identification,	 common-cause,	 implied-
exoneration),
	 within	 hypothetical	 situations for their applica-
tions.
t
2 In WATSON's
	 tusk	 of	 isolating	 radio-receiver	 failures	 at	 the ,p
stage-level
	
[3], the operational status of each stage is defined by the
"normality" of stage-output signal.
^^. t
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As shown in figure 3.2(a), interactions among functional
module A, B, and C are such that A enables B and B enables C.
Operational statuses of B and C are known to be abnormal while A
is known to be normal. To isolate the possible failure in this
example, we first reason that since C is enabled by B and B is
abnormal, the the abnormality of C must be inherited from the
abnormal B (by the "uni-directional" assumption), and thus C is
exonerated (by the "single-failure" assumption). The above rea-
soning steps to exonerate an abnormally-behaved module are called
the Causal-Backtraeing principle,, With C exonerated, we infer
that since B is enabled by A and A is normal, B's abnormality must
be due to its own failure (by the "uni-directional" assumption).
The failure of the PL mechanism is thus postulated to be func-
tional module B. We call such reasoning steps the Failure-
Identification principle. At this point, applications of the two
diagnosis principles illustrated are local in nature, namely, the
related information they utilize always comes from direct neigh-
bors of a module. We now discuss how non-local information can be
incorporated in their deduction processes.
Because of the limited availabilities of sensors, we may not
be able to determine the operational status of each module. By
^ y the single-failure assumption, we can extend the causal-
backtracing principle to achieve indirect failure associations.
For example, in a PL mechanism as shown in figure 3.2(b), by
t\CAr
	 applying the extended version of the backtracing principle., C and
D are exonerated even if the status of C is unknown. 	 Again, by
e ;t
N	
}(
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the fault-identification prinoiple, B 	 is	 postulated	 to	 be	 the
culprit.
	
However,	 not	 in	 all	 eases can the isolation process
localize one specific faulty module. 	 In a
	
PL	 mechanism	 with	 a
E
similar	 causal structure but without the operational status of B,
as shown in figure 3.2(o),	 a	 set	 of	 possible	 faulty	 modules,
namely, B, C, and D, is postulated instead.
We now explore	 a	 more	 sophisticated	 diagnosis	 principle,
called	 the	 Comon-Cause	 principle, which takes the advantage of
special causal-fanout structures existing in 	 the	 PL-model	 of	 a
mechanism.	 In	 a	 situation	 as shown in figure 3.2(d), the fact
that abnormal Cn and abnormal Dm share the same catoal 	 "upstream"
module B imply that the failure is due to a common cause upstream,
namely,
	
B.	 In	 this	 case,	 by	 further	 applying	 the	 fault-
identification	 principle	 on	 A and B, we postulate that B is the
culprit even with no knowledge about the operational
	
statuses	 of
Cl...Cn-1
	 and D1 ... Dm-1.
The dia^nCLS,j	 principles	 developed	 so	 far	 emphasize	 the
direct	 and	 indirect	 uses	 of module-abnormalities (symptoms) in
postulating
	 possible	 failures.	 We	 now
	
discuss	 the	 Implied.- ^	 e
♦ t
A Exoneration	 principle which excludes some functional modules from
I
p
i
failure possibilities by reasoning with normal (or no-fault) meas-
urements.
	 To be able to apply the implied-exoneration principle,
we introduce an "intentional design" assumption which 	 states:	 "a
ire	 .
functional
	 module	 will	 not	 operate	 normally	 unless	 all	 its *`
enabling-preconditions are satisfied". This
	
mean•,	 if	 a	 module ^t
i fails,	 all	 modules	 causally-enabled by it will show symptoms if
23	 UNIGINAL PAGE igOF PQOR QUALITY
sensor-measurements are available.	 Also, no	 module	 should	 have
implicit redundancies built in 3 .	 Potential	 applications	 of	 the
implied-exoneration 	 principle	 are	 illustrated by an example, as
shown in figure 3.3.	 In	 the	 Pi.-modeled	 mechanism	 with	 causal
relationships	 as	 shown	 in	 figure	 3.3 1 knowing that functional
module F is abnormal prompts the	 postulation	 of	 a	 failure	 set
which
	
includes	 A,	 H,	 C,	 D,	 G,	 and	 H by applying the fault-
n° identification principle. 	 However, knowing F	 is	 operating	 nor-
mally	 causes	 us to assert, by the implied-exoneration principle,
f,
that A t
 Bf and C must be operating normally even though no 	 direct
measurements are available. (D may be partially faulty, namely, it
may have a normal output to E while fails in	 the	 output	 to	 G.) R
Therefore,	 by	 applying	 the	 implied-exoneration	 principle, the
fault-isolation process postulates a smaller possibility-set 	 with 1
l D, G, and H being potential culprits.
^t
In reviewing Brown's WATSON approach for the 	 troubleshooting
of	 ra¢io-receivers	 13J 4 ,	 we	 find	 it	 is	 a simple case of our
fault-identification process, 	 namely,	 it	 is	 a	 straightforward
application	 of the identification principle alone to a near-ideal !II
mechanism: a radio-receiver with stage-decomposed modules.
3
In case of a real-world mechanism in which redundancies	 do	 exist,
+
rV°R
they	 should be made explicit in the causal description. The detail will
cf^
be discussed within the context of flow-causality models.rn
r..
The author must point out that WATSON's reasoning is for 	 the	 gen-
erations	 of	 test-points,
	
which	 implicitly assumes that the status of
each functional module can be determined. Thus, our comment is not about
r
the	 weakness	 of	 his	 approach, rather, is about the generality of his
theory.
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Figure 3.3 Examples to Illustrate Fault-Isolation Principle (cont.)
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Fault 1golation ,A .A Rail--World ,gig Mechanism
The study of failure isolation on the ideal mechanism 	 serves
as	 the foundation for the understanding of failure isolation in a
non-ideal real-world mechanism.
	
Summarizing the results from pre-
vious	 discussions,	 the	 four diagnostic principles are developed
based on following assumptions made on an ideal PL mechanism:
" a	 Single-FailureAssumption --Only[] y one failure can occur in	 a
mechanism at a time.
[b]	 Unix-Directional Ass r,wption -- Propagation of 	 causal	 effects
among	 functional	 modules	 are	 "uni-directional". 	 Only one
failure occurs at one time.
[c]	 Status-Determinable Assumption -- There exists a	 mapping	 by
which	 the	 normal abnormal	 operational status of each Tune--
1
tional module can be determined if some sensory 	 measurements
are available.
Applying these four diagnosis principles to non-ideal mechan-
is-zas results in a heuristic (rather than exclusive) set of failure
^`	 F
,k
hypotheses in the sense that the actual failure will 	 be	 included
w	
p
a	 ^
in	 the	 possibility set most of the time -- exceptions are due to #'
violations of ideal assumptions on the PL mechanism.	 To layout	 a
n practical	 approach	 for	 failure	 isolations in a non-ideal real-
1 ^ 41
world mechanism and to understand the limitation of such approach,
it	 is	 most helpful to discuss our fault-isolation methodology by
studying the conditions under which these 	 ideal	 assumptions	 are
violated in an analog mechanism. t
rt
a
s
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j{ ^	 I
!J7i'll{  The single-failure assumption is consistent with the purpose
of our hypothesization task, which is to postulate a set of
primary-failure possibilities. With respect to the second assump-
tion of uni-directional casual propagation, we rarely find any
real-world mechanism which can satisfy this assumption without
exceptions. Therefore, we propose a flow-causality model which
organizes the functionality of an engineered mechanism into
causally-related flow-groups. The intention is to provide a func-
tional decomposition of the overall mechanism into modules of
flow-subsystems with neat-unidirectional inter-module interac-
tions. Within a flow-group, variables are closely-associated in
h	
the sense that any failure "almost" certainly will affects all
I^s
variables in the same flow subsystem.
	
Such property of close 	 ?
'W	 associations among variables also makes the condition favorable to
F
apply the four diagnosis heuristics since the operational status
of each functional module is likely to reflect on any given sensor
within the flow subsystem. Interesting as the idea may sound, we
have to stress at this point that there exists counter-examples in
	
real-world mechanisms which will, conditionally violate the basic 	 }`	 i
3
assumptions of the PL model. 	 Therefore, the effectiveness of
	
applying the four diagnostic heuristics to a real-world mechanism
	 {,,
i
depends on how often the ideal assumptions are violated -- which,
in author's opinion, is an engineering-oriented issue.	 For this	 ^^ 99
	
reason, the author emphasizes the engineering aspect of our 	 ;`I
hypothesization methodology in terms of its usefulness, rather
than its theoretical importance.
I
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3.2. ,Z.., .	 FunctigpAj, Decompositions And ,thg ZjgX-Cans lity Model
Our	 of developing the	 Flow-causality	 model	 of	 apurpose
mechanism is to create a functional description which is organi-
zationally similar to that of the Production-Line model 	 in	 the
hope	 that	 the	 ^,solation	 principles	 developed	 for the ideal
mechanism can be similarly applied for the generation	 of	 fault
hypotheses.
Intuitively, the functionality of an	 engineered	 mechanism
can	 be	 described as a set of causally-related subsystems which
implements the intention of
	 its	 designer.	 For	 example,	 the
mechanism of a simple ,jet-airplane can be functionally organized
h into following subsystems: the fuel subsystem, the 	 engine	 sub-
..
system,
	 the	 oil	 subsystem,	 the electrical subsystem, and the
hydraulic	 subsystem.
	
Following	 the	 intention	 of	 airplane
n
engineers, the causalities among the subsystems are, as shown in
4-!
g figure 3.u, such that the fuel subsystem drives the engine	 sub-
system, and the engine subsystem in turns drives tho oil subsys-
tem, 	 the electrical subsystem, and the hydraulic subsystems.
In order to activate each subsystem, the designer 	 arranges
j
a	 set	 of	 components	 in	 such	 a way that some "products", or
i
called "medium" can be forced to other causally-depended subsy6- ;;n
tems.	 With	 this	 view, we can abstractly characterize a func-
tional
	
subsystem	 as	 a	 "flow
	
subsystem"	 which	 creates	 and ► ^^4'
transfers	 a	 particular type of medium to other subsystems, and
the sensors in a subsystem serve to monitor 	 the	 "potential-of-
ij
flow"
	
or	 the	 "rate-of-flaw"
	
at	 various	 points	 of	 a	 flow r
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Figure 3.4 Causal Dependencies among Subsystems of an Airplane Mechanism
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subsystem. In some types of flow subsystems, the medium is
stored (as in 9,.1, oil subsystem) rather than created (as in a
electrical subsystem), thus the "quantity-of-medium" ('as the
oil-quantity) becomes relevant. Some typical flow subsystems
and their corresponding media are listed below:
.Types. sf	 ZIS& Media
Oil Subsystem	 engine-oil
Hydraulic Subsystem
	
hydraulic-fluid
Electrical Power Subsystem	 electricity
Thermal -Transfer Subsystem	 heat
Pneumatic Subsystem
	
air
An interesting observation is that the flow-variables
within a flow subsystem are closely-associated in the sense that
there seldom is a case that symptoms of a failure show on some,
but not all, of the flow variables. In contrast, variables
belong to two causally-related subsystems are likely to be
unidirectional -associated in the sense that a failure in the
"driven" subsystem usually will not reflect on the "driving"
subsystem.
Finally, we discuss representational issues of the flow-
causality model by an example of cooling mechanism, commonly
used in the central air-conditioning system, as shown in figure
3.5(a). As shown in figure 3.5(b), the cooling mechanism is
functionally decomposed into three flow -subsystems: the
electrical -subsystem, the water -circulation subsystem, and the
heat-removing subsystem, with electricity, water, and heat as
flow-media respectively.
P
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Figure 3.5 A Cool ing-Mechanism Example for the Flow-Causality Model
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The causalities among these three subsystems are described
as following:
(drive 'ELECTRICAL-SUBSYSTEM 'WATER-CIRCULATION-SUBSYSTEM)
(drive 'WATER-CIRCULATION-SUBSYSTEM 'HEAT-REMOVING-SUBSYSTEM)
For each flow-subsystem, we further establish the associa-
tion between each function roles and physical components by
which the function is actually implemented. As shown in figure
3.6 0 the abstract functional role "reservoir" is implemented as
the "WATER-TANK", the "booster" as "WATER-PUMP", etc. The
"delivery-path" is implemented by a group of components which
structurally are in series. A frame-like representation is
adopted to describe the subsystem model:
subsystem-name: 'WATER-CIRCULATION
abstract-functional-template: 'HYDRO-FLOW-CIRCULATION
medium: 'WATER /* a-kind-of non-compressible fluid */
functional-roles: /* mapping to the structural components */
reservoir: 'WATER-TANK
supply-path: 'LO
booster: 'WATER-PUMP
delivery-path:
(in-series L1 FILTER L2 HEAT-EXCHANGER L3 RADIATOR L4)
drain: 'WATER-TANK
Notice that the specification in the "abstract-functional-
template" slot serves as a linkage to a body of knowledge about
•i
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a general non-compressible hydro-flow circulation subsystem
which this particular WATER-CIRCULATION-SUBSYSTEM is an instance
of.	 To be included in	 this	 knowledge	 chunk	 is	 a	 piece	 of
knowledge	 to	 map	 observed	 symptoms	 into	 a	 set	 of failure
hypotheses5.
In a mechanism with built-in redundancies at the 	 subsystem
level,	 these	 special	 relationships	 will	 be	 explicitly
represented in their causal descriptions. 	 For	 example,	 in	 a
N
modern DC-10-like [4] airplane, the fuel subsystem, the electri-
cal subsystem, and the hydraulic subsystem are all designed with
,r
heavy redundancies, as shown in figure 3.'l. 	 As a typical	 ease,
P the	 casual relationships between the power-plants (engines) and
the electrical subsystem will be described as:
t,
(drive
a (or
ry
'POWER-PLANT-1
zfi POWER-PLANT-2 A.
s 'POWER-PLANT-3
'ELECTRICAL-SUBSYSTEM
)
ti
r
h	 1
i
i
5 One simple approach is to attach a pre-coded 	 procedural	 knowledge
to	 the	 frame of abstract flow-subsystem so that it can be inherited by "•
all flow-subsystems of the same type.
	
Our emphasis is on the 	 organiza-
tion	 of	 the	 flow-subsystem	 knowledge.	 The failure-postulation pro- +
cedure, because of its engineering nature,
	 is	 not	 discussed	 in	 this
thesis.	 An illustration of its applications will be discussed later in i
an example.
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3.2•2.2. ,Failure Hvoothesization Wjj .LU, Elgii-Causality Mg_del_
The task of failure hypothesization is achieved in two
steps: subayates isolation and failure postulation. In this
section, we illustrate the process of failure hypothesization by
the example of water-cooling mechanism, shown in figure 3.5.
Firot, we deal with the problem of isolating the faulty
:subsystem.
	
The	 subsystem-level of a flow-causality model pro-
,
vides a description of	 causal	 relationships	 among	 subsystems
us	 f the	 deal PL-modeled mechanism. 	 Asanalogo 	 to that o	 i	 p
condition to applying the four 	 isolation	 principles	 developed
for
	
the ideal mechanism, we need to define a predicate by which
^ the operational status of each subsystem can be determined 	 from
s
its related sensors, which happen to be available.	 Knowing that
^s
sensors are installed in an 	 operational	 mechanism	 to	 monitor }
flow-related	 variables,	 thus,	 by	 the	 flow-causality	 model, iu
available sensors are divided into groups according to 	 associa-
tions	 of their corresponding variables.	 The operational status
of each subsystem module is defined as follows: (1) 	 the	 status
is	 said to be normal if all available sensors in a flow zu^sys-
t
tem have normal readings, (2) the status is said to be 	 abnormal
s
if	 any	 sensor in the subsystem shows deviation from. its normal
u	 value, and (3) the status is unknown	 if	 no	 sensor-reading	 is
available.	 With	 the	 definition	 of the subsystem status, the ^,F
four isolation heuristics can be applied to isolate 	 the	 faulty'
subsystem.
	
In the example of a cooling mechanism, given that P2
and T3 readings are deviated from their normal range but 	 V1	 is
i y
_mow+
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r
normal, we heuristically isolate the failure to the water-
circulation subsystem by applying the causal-backtracing and the
fault-identification principles.
a
Second, with the focus shafted to a particular flow-
subsystem, a set of failure hypotheses is postulated with the
application of the prooedural knowledge inherited from the
1
abstract flow-subsystem to which. this flow-subsystem is an
 instance of. The failure-postulating procedure only concerns
itself about interpreting variables which are related to this
flow-subsystem. Continuing the coolie mechanism exa mple in fiY	 	 g	 -P	 g
ure 3.5, from the sensor-observation that P1 is normal, it
exonerates three functional, roles: the booster, the supply-path,
and the reservoir, from being considered as possible culprits.
	
Thus, the failure, if it indeed occurs within this flow- 	 ,E i
subsystem, must come from the delivery-path or the drain (which
is excluded in this case since it is the open space in the i
WATER-TANK).	 Interpreting a low flow-rate (Ff) detected in a
serial path (L1 -> FILTER -> L2 -> HEAT-EXCHANGER -> L3 ->RADI-
ATOR -> L4), following two rules can be applied:
(1) Upstream-leakage -- any component upstream to the point of
	
detection can be leaking to cause the low flowrate measure-	 11
It
	
.	 went.
(2) Path-cloggage -- any component in the flow path can be
clogged to cause the detected low flowrate.	
I^` x
T	 ^	
=r^
i	 As the result of applying these flow-tracing rules, the
`	 following possible failures are postulated: L1 leakage, L1
v
37
O
i^
ologgage, FILTER cloggage, L2 cloggage, HEAT-EXCHANGER ologgage,
L3 cloggage, RADIATOR cloggage, L4 cloggage. To re-emphasize
,
	
the significance of our hypothesization-and-verification.
approach, we stress that the "L1 leakage" is an outstanding case
during the verification phase due to its unique time-elapsed
t
effects.	 Among the above failure hypotheses, the predictive
analysis process will conclude that only the "L1 leakage" asser-
tion will be expecting further symptom-event: the dropping of P1
to zero after some time delay because the water-tank will even-
y
	
t
tually become empty. If this symptom indeed is observed over the
P1 sensor some time later, the diagnosis process can conclude
that the "L1 leakage" is the culprit.
,¢onclusioa 1
As the conclusion of our study, we propose a
	
future	 computer-
based	 intelligent
	
diagnosis system be organized as shown in figure
}Q}ij-
	 3.8.	 The time-continuous sensory data is first 	 abstracted	 into	 a
sequence
	 of qualitative symptom everts, which will be compared with
3{{
the predicted failure behavior frn-m the intelligent	 diagnosis	 pro-
gram.	 Those	 accepted failure hypotheses, together with their jus-
{
a
tifieations, will be (1) presented through some means of man-machine ^.
interfaces	 (e.g.,	 graphical	 or	 text	 display, voice synthesizer, #	 i
etc.) in a form which can be readily understood by people so	 as	 1"Oo 1fi
help them in their decision-making6 , (2) presented through a 	 shared
6 We call this feature the JA elligent interface
	 since	 it	 presents &
the
	 diagnostic	 result	 with	 concise	 ,justification,	 rather than just
presenting the raw data.
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data base ^n its entirety to other intelligent prcgrams so as to
	
h	 allot other intelligent activities (e.g., recovery-planning) to
4p
proceed.
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